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Abstract.
for all the progress that was made in building barriers against genocide – and we should not shy away
from acknowledging that significant progress was indeed made – we find ourselves facing a major
problem. History is taking its revenge. Since the start of the ‘Arab Spring’ in early 2011, global trends
in mass violence have moved consistently in the wrong direction. The number of armed conflicts
have increased. Some reports suggest a six-hundred fold increase in the annual number of civilian
casualties in war. Atrocity crimes are committed with increasing regularity. Perpetrators exhibit a
confidence bred of impunity. Forced displacement – both internal and international – has reached
levels not seen since the end of the Second World War. I want to examine this global crisis and
enquire into its causes and consequences. I also want to suggest some steps that can be taken to turn
the tide. I want to argue that although the struggle against genocide and mass atrocities is today
confronting an acute crisis, there are grounds for thinking that determined action can hold back the
tide of hate. This can be done by reinvigorating a global politics based on fundamental human rights,
collective action and accountability.
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The field of genocide studies has achieved much in its relatively short lifetime. As a result, we 
have a much better understanding of genocide – that problem from hell – today than we did just 
a few years ago. Genocide research has helped demystify this crime of crimes. We understand its 
causes, its triggers and its processes of escalation much better than we once did. We understand 
how individual agency and local conditions can profoundly influence patterns of violence. Today, 
there are far fewer cases of genocide and mass killing hidden from view than there once was. New 
stories of victims once unknown come to light with each passing year. Their voices, once silenced, 
speak to us with fresh clarity thanks to the painstaking work of the genocide researcher. 
As a result of these endeavors, we have a much better understanding of how genocide 
can be prevented and vulnerable populations protected. Combined with the activism of key 
individuals, governments and international organizations, this knowledge helped give rise to 
what I have described elsewhere as an ‘international human protection regime’ – a complex of 
norms, institutions and practices focused on the minimization of suffering resulting from war, 
atrocities and genocide.1 Combined with other structural forces – the spread and consolidation 
of modern states, industrialization, economic growth and trade, and the social liberalization that 
often accompanied them – this international regime has contributed to a significant decline in the 
incidence of organized violence, including of genocide over the past few decades. 
Recognizing this fact, just a few years ago, a flurry of new books declared that humanity was 
‘winning the war on war’; that our ‘better angels’ were making societies ever more peaceful; that 
we could hope how to eliminate genocide and mass atrocities ‘once and for all.’2 After the tumult 
of the immediate post Cold War period – and the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia – the tide, it 
seemed, had turned against genocide.  International activism in support of peace and structural 
forces unleashed modernization and globalization were having a decisive impact.  If not the end of 
history, then perhaps, the beginning of the end of genocide’s history.
But for all the progress that was made in building barriers against genocide – and we 
should not shy away from acknowledging that significant progress was indeed made – we find 
ourselves facing a major problem. History is taking its revenge.  Since the start of the ‘Arab 
Spring’ in early 2011, global trends in mass violence have moved consistently in the wrong 
direction. The number of armed conflicts has increased. Some reports suggest a six hundred-
fold increase in the annual number of civilian casualties in war. Atrocity crimes are committed 
with increasing regularity. Perpetrators exhibit a confidence bred of impunity.  Forced 
displacement – both internal and international – has reached levels not seen since the end of the 
Second World War.
The basic fact of increasing mass violence is not our only problem. Wherever we look, the 
forces that promoted human rights, human dignity and human protection and the sense of our 
common humanity that gave rise to mutual aid are in seeming retreat. Meanwhile, the forces of 
racism, xenophobia, nationalism, and what Martin Ceadal called “warism” – ideas that are the very 
life blood of genocide – seem to be everywhere on the march.3 
Today, we confront a global crisis in which the progress we have made in winding back the 
tyranny of genocide is being unraveled. Unless urgent action is taken to address the crisis, we risk 
repeating the mistakes of our more violent past. The stakes could not be higher. If we fail to mount 
1 Alex J. Bellamy, “The Humanization of Security: Towards an International Human Protection Regime,” European Journal 
of International Security 1, no. 1 (2016), 112-133.
2 Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (New York: Dutton, 2011); 
Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence has Declined (New York: Penguin, 2012); Gareth Evans, 
The Responsibility to Protect: The Campaign to End Mass Atrocities Once and for All (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 2008).
3 Martin Ceadal, Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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a successful challenge to the march of mass violence, our world will continue to become more 
unstable, more divided, and more violent.  What states, international institutions, and global civil 
society do next will be, quite literally, a matter of life and death for the world’s most vulnerable 
populations.
In this lecture, I want to examine this global crisis and enquire into its causes and consequences. 
I also want to suggest some steps that can be taken to turn the tide. I want to argue that although 
the struggle against genocide and mass atrocities is today confronting an acute crisis, there are 
grounds for thinking that determined action can hold back the tide of hate. This can be done 
by reinvigorating global politics based on fundamental human rights, collective action and 
accountability. 
Winning the War on Genocide
I should start, though with a few words on the barriers erected against genocide in the decades 
following the Holocaust – barriers that became a comprehensive international regime for human 
protection only in the past two decades.  Through Nuremberg, Tokyo, the Eichmann trial and 
other legal innovations, the Holocaust left an indelible marks on world politics: the notions that 
individuals and groups had ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’ rights arising out of their very humanity that 
transcended the sovereign rights of states and that state agents, even political leaders, should be 
held criminally liable serious violations of those rights. In the decades that followed, significant 
normative, political and institutional progress was made to actualize that ideal. An International 
Human Protection regime emerged to give meaning to this ideal. It evolved from at least eight 
interconnected streams of norms, rules, practices and institutional developments that emerged, in 
a variegated way, in response to different aspects of civilian suffering in times of war, genocide and 
mass atrocities.  These were:
One: The elaboration of legal rules governing basic conduct in world affairs: principles of non-
aggression and non-interference to protect weak states from predation by the strong and eliminate 
armed aggression; principles of anti-imperialism and national self-determination that prevented 
strong states translating military successes into legitimated territorial gains.  
Two: The development and extension of international humanitarian law, principally the 
articulation and prohibition of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and including 
recent efforts to prohibit indiscriminate weapons (land mines, cluster munitions, nuclear weapons) 
and the transfer of arms to actors who may use them to commit atrocity crimes (arms trade treaty). 
These rules, now considered customary and jus cogens – in that they apply to all states and no 
derogation is possible – established individuals and groups as the bearers of fundamental rights 
that could not, under any circumstance, be violated.
Three: The establishment of positive legal, political and moral duties to extend protection 
against these crimes across national borders. All States have an extraterritorial obligation to take all 
reasonable measures to prevent genocide. They have an additional responsibility to raise the alarm 
when genocide is committed or imminently apprehended by bringing the matter to international 
attention. 
In relation to war crimes, Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions points to an 
obligation not just to abide by the law but to “ensure respect” for the Conventions around the 
world. Additional Protocol I (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions established a duty for state 
parties to cooperate by acting, individually or jointly, to address serious violations committed in 
the context of an international armed conflict in cooperation with the United Nations (Article 89). 
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees requires that states provide asylum and 
ensure non-refoulement for people fleeing persecution because of their membership of a particular 
race, religion, nationality or social group or because or their political opinions (Article 33). The 
Arms Trade Treaty prohibits the sale of arms in situations where a State Party ‘recognizes that that 
the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians 
protected as such, or other war crimes’ (Article 6.3). 
This idea – that states have positive duties towards outsiders – is not new. As Luke Glanville 
recently pointed out, as early as the eighteenth century, Vattel pointed out that states had “duties 
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to contribute to the perfection of those beyond their borders insofar as they can without doing an 
“essential injury” to themselves.”4 
Four: Acknowledgement by the UN Security Council that genocide and mass atrocities 
constitute a threat to international peace and security, and therefore falls under the purview of 
international society’s collective security system. Starting in 2001 with Sierra Leone and accelerating 
markedly after the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect principle in 2005, the protection of 
civilians from genocide and mass atrocities has moved from the periphery of the Council’s agenda 
to its very core. Today, more than 100,000 UN peacekeepers are deployed around the world with 
Chapter VII enforcement mandates to protect civilians from atrocities. More broadly, the Security 
Council’s recognition of genocide and mass atrocities as a threat to peace has had two profound 
effects on its practice. On the one hand, the likelihood of Council adopting measures in response to 
massacres has doubled since the end of the Cold War. On the other, the nature of these responses 
has grown steadily more comprehensive and multifaceted, with protection at their core.
Five: The development of international criminal justice. The International Criminal Court and 
other criminal tribunals are important for ensuring legal accountability for crimes and addressing 
impunity. 
Six: The codification of human rights and establishment of national, regional and international 
institutions to promote and protect them. We must be mindful of where genocide begins. Genocide 
and mass atrocity crimes are extreme forms of identity-based violence. Their prevention therefore 
entails the elimination of the discrimination, hate speech and incitement that can give rise to identity 
conflict and mass violence – precisely one of the main focuses of international human rights law 
and the institutions that have been developed to promote and protect it. Legal obligations extend to 
addressing some of the root causes of atrocity crimes. In this context, among the most important are 
those international treaties that address entrenched patterns of discrimination, whether on grounds 
of nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender or other forms of identity. Most national constitutions 
and legal codes include provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of populations, such as 
equality before the law. States are also required to combat advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, in line with Articles 19 
and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Seven: The development of international legal and institutional regimes focused on specific 
vulnerabilities, including those faced by refugees, displaced persons, people with disabilities, 
women and girls, and children more broadly. This includes efforts, albeit nowhere close to fully 
realized, to empower women as agents of protection.
Eight: The political commitment to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005 and its 
implementation thereafter. In a sense, R2P clarifies the protection regime itself. R2P is a disarmingly 
simple idea. It holds that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own populations 
from four crimes that indisputably ‘shock the conscience of humankind’: genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It requires that the international community assist 
individual states to fulfill their responsibility, because some states lack the physical capacity and 
resources of legitimacy needed to protect their populations from these crimes. Finally, R2P says that 
when states are ‘manifestly failing’ to protect their populations from these four crimes, whether 
through lack of capacity or will or as a result of deliberate intent, the international community 
should respond in a ‘timely and decisive’ fashion with diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means and, failing that, with all the tools that are available to the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council. R2P calls specifically for the prevention of the four crimes and – significantly – 
their incitement.       
These eight streams were developed separately at different times and without specific regard 
for the broader whole. But it was their collective force that made a difference, beginning in earnest 
only after the Cold War. Along with structural forces such as state consolidation, economic growth 
and trade, and factors that Azar Gat conjoins under the rubric of ‘modernization,’ these barriers to 
 
4 Luke Glanville, “Responsibility to Perfect: Vattel’s Conception of Duties Beyond Borders,” International Studies Quarterly 
61, no. 2 (2017), 385.
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genocide and mass atrocities began to effect patterns of violence in earnest in the 1980. Genocide 
and mass atrocities were forced into decline.5
RJ Rummel’s multiple surveys of ‘democide’ – the mass killing of people by their own 
government – in the twentieth century show a clear pattern of decline from a peak around the time 
of the Second World War.6 This general trend is also found in the data presented by the Political 
Instability Task Force (PITF), which focuses on the incidence of government sponsored mass 
killings and shows a sustained decline since 1993.7 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
and the 2013 Human Security Report presented a similar view that showed a steady decline in 
the number of cases from a peak in 2001 and a decline in the number of violent deaths globally.8 
There were especially marked declines in the Americas, Central and South Asia, East Asia and 
Oceania, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa. The normative developments charted earlier reshaped 
our expectations about how the world ought to respond to genocide and mass atrocities. 
We think we fail so much nowadays at least in part because we expect so much more than 
we once did. 
It bears remembering that in the wake of Nuremberg, Rafael Lemkin lamented that had Nazi 
Germany exterminated only German Jews, it would have committed no international crime.9 Today, 
however, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are recognized as international 
crimes; states have positive legal, political and moral duties to prevent them and offer assistance 
across borders; the UN Security Council understands these to be matters of international peace and 
security falling within its purview; and a range of national, regional and international institutions 
have been established to assist states and to hold them to account. 
But the struggle against atrocities is in crisis. The barriers to genocide erected in the decades 
after the Holocaust are being torn down.
The Revenge of History 
Since 2011, genocide, mass atrocities, armed conflict, and global displacement have all moved in 
the wrong direction, prompting expressions of concern and alarm. After declining some 72% after 
1990, the number of major civil wars grew from four to eleven after 2011, with the cumulative 
battle deaths reaching levels in 2014 and 2015 not seen since the end of the Cold War.10 Minor civil 
wars have also increased, reaching a level not seen since the mid-1990s. From the use of chemical 
weapons against civilians in Syria, to the brazen atrocities committed by violent extremists in 
Syria and Iraq and the indiscriminate use of air power against civilian populated areas in Syria 
and Yemen, the deliberate targeting of civilians and violation of International Humanitarian Law 
has become a regular feature of many modern armed conflicts.  Reported attacks on protected 
buildings, such as hospitals and schools, and on protected persons such as humanitarian workers 
have increased. The besieging of civilian communities, denial of humanitarian relief and use of 
civilians as human shield have become commonplace features of the modern battlefields in places 
such as Aleppo and Mosul.  
In Syria and Yemen, the situation of civilians besieged or otherwise unable to flee conflict 
zones has become so dire since 2015 that many have reportedly confronted the very real danger of 
starvation and often die for want of basic medical assistance. Indeed, the eradication of starvation 
– a genuine human achievement of the past few decades – is now at risk as a result of the march of 
mass atrocities.  
5 Azar Gat, The Causes of War and the Spread of Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
6 Rudolph J. Rummel, Death by Government (Piscataway: Transaction, 1994); Rudolph J. Rummel, Statistics of Democide 
(Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 1997).
7 Benjamin A. Valentino, “Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence against Civilians,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 17 (2014), 100.
8 Human Security Report, Human Security Report 2013: The Decline in Global Violence: Evidence, Explanation and Contestation 
(Barnaby: Simon Fraser University, 2013), 107.
9 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 49.
10 Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 4-2016.
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Global trends show a sharp increase in ‘one-sided’ violence against civilians, beginning in 
2013; and whilst atrocity crimes declined in 2015 from their peak a year earlier, they remained at 
levels not seen since 2001.11 
To understand precisely what is going on, we need to understand that violence is driven by 
different concerns in different contexts. Foremost amongst the drivers of our more violent world 
is the lethality of new armed conflicts in the Middle East, in particular in Syria but also in Iraq 
and Yemen. The underlying causes of the armed conflicts that today plague the Middle East lay in 
crises of governance caused by the failure of authoritarian rulers to legitimize their rule or improve 
the lives of their populations and by the repeated self-interested interference of outside powers. 
They were triggered by forces unleashed by the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and 2011 Arab Spring. 
Confronted by internal demands for reform, governments turned their guns on their own 
populations. Rebellions in Syria, Iraq and Yemen were all caused and then escalated by systematic 
discrimination against and violent abuse of individuals and groups not aligned to the government. 
They were further fuelled by external actors looking to exploit instability for their own advantage. In 
all of these conflicts, the deliberate targeting of civilians has been justified through the articulation 
of violent extremist ideologies that make no distinction between soldiers and civilians, ideologies 
that have gained in strength as the cycle of violence has escalated. 
The second cluster of violence relates specifically to the rise of violent extremism in the Middle 
East, parts of sub-Saharan Africa (parts of Nigeria, Somalia, Mali), parts of central Asia (Afghanistan 
and parts of Pakistan), Europe, and parts of Southeast Asia (Myanmar and The Philippines). Violent 
extremist violence unleashed by Islamist non-state armed groups such as ‘Islamic State,’ al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab overtly challenge established international norms 
and openly advocate atrocity crimes. Responses to violent extremism have also sometimes been 
quite bloody themselves. For example, since 2011, Boko Haram has been responsible for more 
than 11,000 deaths, more than 6,000 of which resulted from one-sided massacres of civilians. The 
Nigerian government’s response has been no less brutal. Some 7,000 Boko Haram suspects have 
died in custody during that time.12  
Many of these conflicts have their roots in specific localities. For example, it was a combination 
of local political intrigues and heavy handed policing that transformed Boko Haram from a small 
extremist sect into an armed militia capable of withstanding the attentions of the Nigerian army. In 
these contexts, political entrepreneurs exploit ethnic and religious divisions for their own ends and 
have developed extremist anti-civilian ideologies that reject fundamental principles of common 
humanity. 
The third cluster of crises predates 2011 but remain unresolved. Conflicts in South Sudan, 
Sudan, Somalia, the DRC, Nigeria, CAR, Mali and Myanmar may have experienced peaks of 
violence in the past few years but their origins and much of their violence predate 2011. Colonial 
orders have yet to be fully replaced by legitimate state institutions capable of imposing the rule of 
law across their entire territory. Here, the rule of law is weak, and factions struggling for power have 
committed atrocity crimes and have sought to advance the interests of one part of the community 
at the expense of others. 
The scale of these crises has been exacerbated by two further factors. First, declining 
international resolve to stop them. States of all stripes are seemingly less willing to uphold their 
legal obligations and shared responsibilities by acting collectively to prevent genocide and mass 
atrocities or respond to them by protecting populations in a timely and decisive fashion. There is 
evidence of declining compliance with fundamental tenets of International Humanitarian, Human 
Rights and Refugee Law, not just by the violent extremists and authoritarian states that perpetrate 
atrocity crimes but also by states of good standing and even some champions of human protection. 
In the face of the crisis of human protection described earlier, some states have wound back their 
commitment to crucial norms and principles. The Trump Administration, for example, has eased 
targeting restrictions aimed at protecting civilians from indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks. 
11 Eric Melander, Therese Pettersson and Lotta Themner, “Organised Violence, 1989-2015,” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 
5 (2016), 617-631.
12 Wisdom Oghasa Iyekekpolo, “Boko Haram: Understanding the Context,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 12 (2016), 2211-2228.
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Several others, including Hungary and Australia, have adopted refugee policies, which, the UNHCR 
believes, contradicts their legal obligations under the Refugee Convention and associated protocol. 
Burundi has withdrawn from the International Criminal Court, and South Africa and The Gambia 
threatened to do likewise, placing this new institution under immense political pressure. Others, 
such as The Philippines, could follow suit largely because the Court has become an inconvenience. 
Foreign actors have also played significant roles in stoking some of the violence. Whilst, for 
example, the principal blame from the carnage in Syria must reside with the Syrian government 
we must also recognize that a number of states and other actors actively fuelled the conflict and 
encouraged its escalation. This includes Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, and 
increasingly the US, but also – though to a lesser extent – the UK and France. There has been a 
significant increase in the involvement of outside states in civil wars. In 1990, only 4% of civil wars 
were “internationalized” through the direct involvement of other states. By 2015, that figure had 
increased to 40%.13 Many of these civil wars were characterised by mass atrocities and experienced 
interventions by multiple external states. Some of these external actors – such as Russia in Syria 
and Saudi Arabia in Yemen – have used force in support of actors responsible for widespread 
and systematic atrocity crimes, have supported such uses of force, and have themselves directed 
attacks that have resulted in large-scale civilian casualties. Some of these attacks, such as the 
Russian bombing of a UN aid convoy in Syria in September 2016 and repeated Saudi bombing of 
schools and hospitals in Yemen, may in themselves constitute war crimes. These and other states 
have supplied the arms and ammunition used to commit atrocity crimes or have turned a blind eye 
to their transportation to the perpetrators of atrocities – in contravention of the spirit and letter of 
the Arms Trade Treaty. What is more, in Syria and Yemen, the scale of mass atrocities crimes is at 
least in part due to the sense of impunity granted to perpetrators by their Great Power allies: Russia 
in the case of the Syrian government, and the US in terms of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and 
Iraq. These states have inhibited accountability for atrocity crimes in the Middle East.  
Causes
Why has the world taken this turn towards the more violent?  One of the most popular theories 
is Pankaj Mishra’s thesis that what we are seeing is merely the latest phase of a backlash against 
modernization and globalization.14 Mishra maintains that Western style modernization uprooted 
traditional cultures and societies but failed to replace them with new locally grounded and 
legitimated ideas about how we should live. That was not much of a problem for those who benefitted 
materially from the global transformation but it created a reservoir of resentment amongst those 
who did not benefit, those on the receiving end of the ever-widening inequalities between rich and 
poor. Extremist ideologues – entrepreneurs of disenchantment – exploited this resentment to their 
own advantage. Romantics responded to modernity with nationalism and mythology; anarchists, 
communists and fascists with wildly utopian visions of a world reordered; Islamists with dreams 
of the caliphate and the restoration of their own – extremist – accounts of sha’ria. In Mishra’s vision, 
today’s jihadists and white extremists are simply contemporary manifestations of the same forces 
that brought anarchist terrorism, socialism and fascism to the streets of Europe in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.
This account is illuminating inasmuch as it points to the inevitability of violent resistance to 
transformational change and shows that far from being unique and novel, the extremism of today 
draws from the same reservoirs of human resentment that drove extremism a century ago. But it 
is a one-sided accounting that pays little attention to the goods wrought by modernization, not 
least among them sharp declines in poverty, and increases both the quality and length of life.  It 
is also too general in its explanation. It struggles to explain why this type of violence emerged in 
some times and places and not others undergoing similar transformations. Here, I suspect that the 
ideologues play a more significant role than this account suggests. 
So too do local conditions. The rise of Boko Haram, for example, had next to nothing to do with 
13 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 4-2016.
14 Pankaj Mishra, Age of Anger: A History of the Present (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017).
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industrialization and modernization and everything to do with local politics and the authorities’ 
mistreatment of opposition activists. Likewise, it was not ‘modernization’ that sparked the Sunni 
rebellion in Iraq that eventually gave rise to Islamic State. After all, many of Iraq’s Sunnis had 
profited under Saddam’s modernization schemas. Rather, it was the collapse of Saddam’s regime, 
their loss of privilege, wealth and security, and the sometimes brutal discrimination against them 
by the Shi’ite controlled government in Baghdad that drove their resentment: products of the US 
decision to invade in 2003.
An alternative account suggests that the problem lay not in the fact of violence, but rather 
in our interpretation of it. That is, the elevated normative expectations I mentioned earlier were 
not, as it was claimed, products of a universally understood conception of humanity and human 
rights but rather of a liberal moment in world politics made possible by Western hegemony after 
the Second World War and its triumph after the Cold War.  As EH Carr explained in 1939, perhaps 
the ‘common morality’ that underpinned the struggle against genocide after the Holocaust was 
actually nothing more than the interests and preferences of the powerful masquerading as universal 
moral truth.15 If Carr was right, then important elements of the struggle against genocide – human 
rights and humanitarian law, human rights institutions, R2P, international criminal justice – might 
be better understood as products of a Western liberal governed international system rather than 
normative standards genuinely shared by the society of states. And, if that is correct, the relative 
decline of the West should result in the relative decline of Western liberal values measured in terms 
of declining compliance and the declining will and capacity of states and institutions to ensure 
compliance. From this perspective, we are witnessing end times of human rights, as Stephen 
Hopgood eloquently explained.16
I have always baulked at the association of the West with liberalism and fundamental ideas 
about human rights, not least because it exaggerates the extent to which Western states actually 
championed these rights and also because it simultaneously neglects the ideas, struggles and 
advocacy of non-Western leaders, activists and communities.  The campaign against colonialism 
was prefaced on the idea all humans enjoyed certain fundamental rights, not least to life and liberty. 
Western states were among those most implacably opposed to these notions. It was African and 
other post-colonial states, that argued – in the context of apartheid South Africa – that governments 
were not entitled to discriminate on the grounds of race or to treat their populations however 
they saw fit; arguments which at the time often met opposition in the West, not least the US and 
UK. More recently, R2P was devised by a commission co-chaired by an Algerian (Mohammed 
Sahnoun), placed on the UN’s agenda by a Ghanian (Kofi Annan), and negotiated by a General 
Assembly led by a diplomat from Gabon. Rwanda, South Africa and Pakistan played pivotal roles 
in those negotiations. It was Guatemala that proposed the UN General Assembly’s first resolution 
affirming the principal, over the objections of many European states. In all this, it bears remembering 
that John Bolton – the US Ambassador to the UN at the time – remained implacably opposed to 
the concept and that by the time that the UN got around to adopting R2P, the African Union 
had already adopted more forceful language on atrocity responses into its own constitution. The 
same is true of other institutions. There was little diplomatic pressure, and certainly no coercive 
inducement, placed on states to agree, sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC. The US, recall, 
is not a state party.   
Treaties, resolutions and positions have to persuade a majority of states to be adopted by the 
United Nations. It is a long time since the West had the numbers to control a majority in the UN. 
But that is precisely why Carr’s diagnosis of ‘moral universalism’ as simply the preferences of 
the powerful is not an accurate description of our context today. Only those ideas that command 
a majority drawn from every part of the world can advance. Most, if not all, of the legal and 
institutional barriers against genocide have commanded a sustained majority. They are, I think, 
signifiers of an ‘overlapping moral consensus’ against genocide and mass atrocities, not a thinly 
veiled Western moral hegemony.
15 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis: Introduction to International Relations (London: Papermac, 1987 [1939]), 42-43. 
16 Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).
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Setting these two explanations alongside one another does highlight one critical point: our 
explanation of the present must address two distinct problems: why is violence increasing and 
why is international society seemingly less able to control it? In relation to the first question, 
Mishra’s account exposes how radical social and economic transformations can give rise to 
violent backlashes though it was not always modernization that lay at the heart of the problem: 
local politics and foreign invasions have proven equally significant in recent rimes. Nonetheless, 
fragmentation, inequality, instability and ideology provide us with a useful way of understanding 
violent extremism.
But violent extremism is only one of the things making our world more violent. Another, is 
the incomplete globalization of international society. By this, I mean the project of establishing a 
global order comprised of sovereign states capable of maintaining order within their boundaries 
without having to resort to mass violence.  Many of the conflicts that give rise to genocide and mass 
atrocities today might be characterized as wars of state formation and consolidation – wars about 
what the boundaries of the state should be, what ideological and constitutional form it should take, 
and who should control it and on what basis. Of these many occur in countries where the states 
have barely – if ever – exercised legitimate control over the whole of their territory. In Sudan, South 
Sudan, Somalia, DRC, CAR, Mali, and Myanmar there have been many more years of war than of 
peace since independence and atrocity crimes have been longstanding features of these wars in 
part because of their practical utility and in part because the association of peoples and territories 
lay at their core. But in addition to these residual conflicts, the ‘Arab Spring’ gave rise to a new set 
of conflicts, caused in part by the failure of the Middle East’s authoritarian governments to build 
internal legitimacy and improve the lives of their peoples and in part by external intervention.
This is happening in an era of declining internationalism, in which, as Peter Hayes put it, 
‘onlookers [are too] preoccupied with their own, to them more pressing concerns’ to do what is 
necessary to protect shared international norms.17 This is a trend driven in part by stagnating and 
declining economies in the post Global Financial Crisis world, which has prompted governments 
to look inwards rather than outwards. These sentiments have encouraged states to retreat from the 
active promotion of global anti-atrocity norms abroad, with two principal effects. First, by reducing 
expectations of foreign intervention, sanctions or censure, retreating internationalism has altered 
the balance of costs and payoffs associated with mass atrocities in favour of the payoffs. On the 
costs side, the chances of prosecution, intervention, sanctions and embargoes have declined. On the 
payoff side, the chances of foreign support for perpetrators have increased in some cases. Second, 
the decline of internationalism has elevated suffering by limiting the aid granted to vulnerable 
populations and the survivors of mass violence. Such heightened suffering will only add to the 
reservoir of resentment from where the ideologues of extremism draw their support.  
Response
What then is to be done? Our response to these challenges should be built on rights, collective 
action and accountability. The fundamental human right to be protected from genocide and other 
mass atrocity crimes must be at the heart of what we do. The reaffirmation of rights is central both 
to delineating the bounds of acceptable and unacceptable behavior and in reframing the language 
we use to describe situations and the peoples affected by them. Genocide and mass atrocities are 
crimes and need to be explained as such. The victims of these crimes are not only just that – victims 
of crimes – but also rights-bearing individuals deserving of protection. This needs to be our starting 
point – the satisfaction of fundamental, universal and very basic human rights.
With that in mind, we need to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights. We need nothing 
short of a global campaign to ensure that people know of their rights, understand why they have 
them and how they arose, and to ensure that government fulfills its most basic of duties: the 
provision of order and protection from the violation of fundamental rights. As a start, we need to 
persuade states to sign, ratify and implement the key international treaties and protocols associated 
with the prohibition and prevention of atrocity crimes and provision of assistance to their victims. 
17 Peter Hayes, Why? Explaining the Holocaust (New York: W. W. Norton, 2017), xv.
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Member States should also ensure that atrocity crimes and their incitement are criminalized by 
domestic law. To encourage them to do so, we need a global campaign to reaffirm the world’s 
commitment to the core obligations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law.
The second step is to translate abstract agreements, principles and articles of faith into 
collective action. Global thought on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities remains too 
abstract and generic, which consequently limits its capacity to shape behavior and impel collective 
action.  States are typically risk averse, meaning that it is easier to persuade them to act after the 
fact, when costs and consequences can be calculated and causation attributed than it is to persuade 
them to act prospectively. We need then to think more carefully about the politics and practices of 
collective action. To think in more tangible terms about how to prevent this specific genocide rather 
than genocide in practice; to identify which capabilities are needed for what job, and which need 
strengthening, and how. We need to better at figuring out what political claims and maneuvers 
are required to protect people and what is realistically achievable, and about what capacities are 
required and how, precisely, they can be built. For example, the UN Secretary-General could utilize 
his annual report to member states on R2P to articulate a clear strategy for atrocity prevention. 
National governments could take steps to mainstream atrocity prevention concerns into their 
foreign and development policies. There is also a need for stronger research on atrocity prevention. 
We need to better understand the precise preventive strategies, policies and levers of influence that 
can be used, and by who, to address specific threats and risks. 
Political leadership is also imperative. We need political leaders willing to support global efforts 
against genocide and mass atrocities and prepared to take risks to advance them. New leadership 
will have to come from outside the West. For example, rather than resisting Chinese pretensions to 
leadership through the UN, the West should embrace it and explore ways of transferring greater 
responsibility for international peace and security to it. My main point here is that the traditional 
friends of human protection will need to do more to encourage others to take the lead and should 
be prepared to transfer responsibility to others. 
Finally, accountability is needed to close the gap between normative commitments, legal 
obligations and actual lived reality. International organizations, governments, individual leaders, 
and state agents have specific – individual – responsibilities and obligations related to the protection 
of populations from genocide and mass atrocities. We must work to make them more accountable. 
Accountability helps close the gap between commitment and lived reality by ensuring the rigorous 
and open scrutiny of practice in light of agreed principles.
Individual states must be held accountable to their own societies and their peers to ensure 
that they fill their core protection obligations. We need research and activism to ensure that 
states establish domestic mechanisms to ensure that national authorities are accountable for their 
commitment to the Responsibility to Protect. This could be achieved through regular parliamentary 
debates, permanent parliamentary working groups, annual reports by National Human Rights 
Institutions or Human Rights Ombudspersons, or other mechanisms such as national committees 
for atrocity prevention. We need nothing short of a new domestic politics in each country, one that 
demands action to fulfill the solemn commitments and legal obligation of states.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the struggle against genocide and mass atrocities confronts a major crisis. 
Part of this is simply a function of the increase in global violence. But there are also powerful 
global trends pushing against human protection, forces of racism, nationalism, xenophobia, and 
extremism. But the greatest strength of the barrier erected against genocide after the Holocaust 
is the sustained global consensus on which it rests.  Different cultural traditions have their own 
expressions of human protection. To borrow a label from John Rawls, on this we have a point 
of “overlapping consensus” between the world’s many different conceptions of justice.18 With 
so much normative and political progress made, the challenge now is to make atrocity crimes 
prevention a lived reality and to turn back the tide of violence sweeping the world. We can all play 
18 John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 340.
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a role whether by defending internationalism, filling the knowledge gaps that will help drive better 
informed practice, or by providing the fresh ideas that are sorely needed.  
There remains too much of a gap between the solemn commitments and legal obligations 
of States and the actual lived experience of vulnerable populations. As the new UN Secretary-
General, Antonio Guterres told the Security Council in early 2017, “Our failure to deliver on what 
we have promised by protecting populations from atrocity crimes shames us all. We must do 
better.”19  Indeed, we must. 
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